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The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc
Nadon, and the Supreme Court Act Reference
by Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton
Jamie Cameron*

THE “TENTH” JUSTICE 1
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada are a prerogative of the
prime minister, constrained only by minimal, threshold criteria of eligibility found in the Supreme Court Act (SCA).2 When Prime Minister Harper
appointed a journeyperson, supernumerary member of the Federal Court
of Appeal to one of Quebec’s three positions on the Court, those criteria
provided collateral grounds to attack an appointment that was perceived
as lacking in merit. At the time, there was abundant speculation that Prime
Minister Harper named Justice Nadon in the hope that he would support
the government’s positions and perhaps weaken the Court’s authority.
The spectacle began after Marc Nadon was appointed to the Supreme
Court on October 2, 2013 and sworn in a few days later on October 7. While
his modest reputation as a jurist led to complaints that Nadon was not
well qualifed, the appointment proved vulnerable on legal grounds. The
question under the SCA was whether Quebec’s appointments to the Court
were open only to current judges (i.e. of the Superior Court or Court of
Appeal) and members of the Barreau du Québec. That was salient because
Justice Nadon was a former member of the Quebec bar, having left in 1993
to serve on the Federal Court, Trial Division before being appointed to the
Federal Court of Appeal in 2001.
*
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Professor Emerita, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc Nadon,
and the Supreme Court Act Reference (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2020) [Tenth Justice].
RSC 1985, c S-26 [SCA].
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Amid a rising crisis, the Harper government inserted a corrective
amendment to the SCA in an omnibus bill and referred two questions to
the Supreme Court.3 While Justice Rothstein’s recusal left seven members
of the Court deciding the legality of a colleague’s appointment, Justice
Nadon was excused from duties, prohibited from having contact with the
other judges, and banished from the Supreme Court building.4 On March 21,
2014, with Justice Moldaver dissenting, the Court held that former members of the Quebec judiciary and bar are not eligible for appointment to
the Supreme Court.5 In addition, the Court held that the rules for Supreme
Court appointment are subject to Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 and
subsection 41(d)’s requirement of unanimity between the federal government and provinces.6
The Reference re Supreme Court Act (Reference) meant that Justice
Nadon’s appointment was void ab initio — or non-existent — and to this
day the Supreme Court’s website neither acknowledges nor recognizes
that Marc Nadon was ever a member of the Court.7 After a fashion, he is the
“tenth justice” of the Court because the order-in-council appointing him
was never revoked, and, as he has joked, he may still be a Supreme Court
judge “in law.”8 Meanwhile, in May 2014 the prime minister and minister
of justice’s accusations against then-Chief Justice McLachlin — accusing
her of interfering with the appointment process — placed an ugly asterisk
on the process.9
Scholarship spotlighting landmark Supreme Court decisions and pivotal
moments of institutional history is invaluable. The Tenth Justice is an outgrowth of the authors’ earlier work and Professor Mathen’s appearance at
the House Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. It focuses
on the tussle over statutory construction and exposes testy relations
3

4

5
6
7
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9

Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 at para 7 [SCA Reference]. The questions were: (1) whether a former member of the Quebec bar was eligible for appointment
under sections 5 and 6 of the SCA; and (2) whether Parliament could enact legislation
specifying that former members of the bar are eligible for appointment.
“Supreme Court Nominee Nadon Sequestered During Challenge to Appointment”, CBC
News (4 November 2013), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/supreme-court-nomineenadon-sequestered-during-challenge-to-appointment-1.2355381>.
Ibid.
See Part V, Procedure for Amending the Constitution, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Justice Nadon returned to the Federal Court of Appeal and remained a member of the
Court when The Tenth Justice was published.
Tenth Justice, supra note 1 at 183.
Ibid, ch 7, “The Aftermath.”
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between the judicial and executive branches of government.10 Mathen and
Plaxton provide a rich analytical narrative of the debacle — from Nadon’s
appointment and its fallout, to issues of statutory interpretation, the Reference hearing, and the decision’s political, legal, and institutional aftermath.
If matters of statutory construction can be dry, The Tenth Justice is not,
ofering a riveting read and valuable perspective on an unprecedented and
anomalous event in Supreme Court history.
The Reference is a vexing decision because the prime minister’s seeming disrespect for the Court makes it more difcult to criticize a majority
opinion defending the institution. Though their sympathies are evident,
Mathen and Plaxton refrain from staking a point of view, leaving readers
to wrestle, as did the Court, with a dilemma. In a larger frame, the Reference posed the question of whether it was more principled for the judges
to assert control over appointments to the Court and constitutionalize
that issue, or to accept an interpretation of the SCA that left an appointment in place — one that was widely perceived as an unfriendly strike on
the Court’s vitality and resilience.
THE SCA: ABSURDITIES AND PURPOSES
Appointment to one of Quebec’s seats on the Court depended on the relationship between sections 5 and 6 of the SCA — the general and special
provisions — and whether the SCA treats eligibility the same way in Quebec and the rest of Canada.11 The majority opinion’s interpretation of section 6 excluded Quebec members of the Federal Court from appointment
to the Supreme Court, but not others — such as Justice Rothstein — from
elsewhere in Canada. More generally, the Reference excluded all former
members of the Quebec judiciary and bar from eligibility for appointment to the Court. That exclusion created a double standard between the
four categories of general eligibility under section 5 — inclusive of current and former members of the judiciary and bar — and section 6’s two

10 See Michael Plaxton & Carissima Mathen, “Purposive Interpretation, Quebec, and the
Supreme Court Act” (2013) 22:3 Const Forum Const 15.
11 While section 5’s general provision specifes that a person who is or has been a judge of
the Superior Court and barrister or advocate of at least ten years’ standing is eligible for
appointment, section 6’s special provision provides that at least three of the Court’s members must be appointed from the provincial Court of Appeal or Superior Court, or from
among the advocates of Quebec. SCA, supra note 2, ss 5, 6.
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categories — exclusive to those with current membership on the bench or
bar of Quebec.
The grammatical construction of the provision was to some extent an
exercise in absurdity, that of an “ecstasy of intellectualism.”12 One absurdity under the SCA was that reading the provisions disjunctively meant that
Quebec lawyers not subject to section 5’s requirement of ten years’ standing would be eligible for appointment to the Court immediately upon
attaining membership in the Barreau du Québec. The majority opinion
averted this absurdity by reading section 5’s ten-year requirement into section 6, and then refused at the same time to incorporate section 5’s inclusive defnition of eligibility. This discontinuity between the provisions
generated another absurdity under section 6 because nothing prevented
a former Quebec judge or lawyer from instantly becoming “current” —
and eligible for appointment — by re-joining the bar. Justice Moldaver
described this approach, of reading some aspects of section 5 into section
6 but not others, as a form of “cherry-picking.”13
The language of section 6 does not expressly require currency or
exclude former members of the Quebec judiciary and bar, nor was the
SCA’s legislative history defnitive one way or the other. In the circumstances, a supplementary rationale bolstered the majority’s conclusion
that section 6 required current membership in the judiciary or bar. The
well-established purpose of Quebec’s statutory allocation on the Court
is to ensure the presence of civil law training, expertise, and traditions at
the Court, and a majority of Quebec judges on fve-member panels deciding civil law issues. To that, the majority opinion added a second purpose — related to values of legitimacy and representation — of “enhancing
the confdence of Quebec in the Court.”14 Under that reasoning, a requirement of currency was connected to confdence in the Court because
Quebecers would not accept that those who are not “current members
of civil law institutions” are qualifed to represent their interests on the
Supreme Court of Canada.15
Yet currency, without more, was a questionable proxy for values of
representativeness and confdence. Justice Moldaver complained that
importing Quebec’s “social values” into eligibility criteria 140 years after
12 See Criss Jami Salomé, In Every Inch In Every Mile (USA: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011) at no 14.
13 SCA Reference, supra note 3 at para 124.
14 Ibid at para 56.
15 Ibid.
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the fact was “unsupported by the text and history of the Act.”16 Noting,
as well, that residence in the province is not required, he observed that
membership in the bar could rest on “the most tenuous link to the practice of civil law in Quebec.”17 Moreover, confdence in the Court would
hardly be served if a former member could become eligible for appointment under section 6 by re-joining the Barreau for a single day.18 Justice
Moldaver found it difcult to believe that Quebecers would have confdence in an appointee who re-joined the bar for a day just to satisfy the
currency requirement.19
Those troubled by the prime minister’s exercise of the prerogative to
appoint Supreme Court justices might also be uncomfortable with a majority opinion that failed to answer or displace the reasoning of the dissent,
and quite frankly appeared more outcome-oriented than principled. In this,
The Tenth Justice stopped short, and though co-authorship might have been
a complicating factor, Mathen and Plaxton do not express a clear point of
view.20 What is most intriguing about the Reference is the decision-making dynamic of a difcult and unprecedented situation that challenged
the Court to decide whether to push back against the executive power of
appointment and how far to go in doing so. Much more could be said on
how the argument from principle could have gone in either direction and
what, ultimately, should have been determinative in the Reference.
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF APPOINTMENTS
Not only did the majority opinion create a double standard on eligibility,
but it constitutionalized Supreme Court appointments and set unanimity between the federal government and provinces as the threshold for
amending the rules of Supreme Court appointment.21 Mathen and Plaxton describe this as “downright jaw-dropping”22 and “the most stunning
aspect of the reference.”23 As they explain, constitutionalizing the SCA’s
eligibility criteria may have the efect of making “perfectly legitimate
16
17
18
19
20

Ibid at para 145.
Ibid at para 150.
Ibid at para 149.
Ibid at paras 153–54.
The authors did note the majority opinion’s failure to engage these concerns. Tenth Justice,
supra note 1 at 104–05.
21 SCA Reference, supra note 3 at paras 104–05.
22 Tenth Justice, supra note 1 at 111.
23 Ibid at 156.
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reforms” impossible, absent constitutional amendment.24 To the extent
the Court looked “dangerously vulnerable” and was “right to worry” that
this, or another prime minister, might alter the institution in fundamental
ways — even abolishing it — the Reference removed some of that fragility.25
But it did so at the expense of fexibility, with the “perhaps unintended
side efect of choking of reforms” that could heighten the Court’s legitimacy and efectiveness.26
Still, it was the prime minister’s appointment of Nadon and the federal
government’s corrective amendment to the SCA that created the opportunity for the majority opinion to maximize its authority and constitutionalize Supreme Court appointments.
REASONABLE PEOPLE CAN DISAGREE
The authors accept that “reasonable people can disagree” about the key
issues at stake in the Reference.27 Quite apart from the SCA’s low-threshold eligibility criteria, the executive power of appointment can undermine
confdence in the Supreme Court in a variety of ways, such as making
ill-considered appointments and disregarding the conventions around
appointment. It is the existence of that power, not the opportunity to
appoint a former judge or member of the provincial bar, that poses a
more serious threat to public confdence in the Court. The risk that the
power to appoint might be improperly and even subversively exercised is
a function of the prerogative and a longstanding lack of transparency and
accountability in appointments to the Court. Though appointments are
now subject to a process, the prerogative remains in place.28
In hindsight, it is not so obvious that appointing Justice Nadon or
other former members of the Quebec judiciary or bar would undermine
confdence in the Court in a legally or constitutionally signifcant way. By
contrast, the Reference presents a strong counterofensive that changed
the status of appointments and did so in a legally and constitutionally signifcant way. That is why reasonable people can certainly disagree about
24
25
26
27
28

Ibid at 161.
Ibid at 181.
Ibid.
Ibid at 121, 123.
See Ofce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Afairs Canada, “Supreme Court of
Canada Appointment Process - 2021” (19 February 2021), online: Government of Canada
<www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/scc-csc/2021/index-eng.html>.
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whether the Court overreached its authority in this instance or acted, as
expected and required, to protect the institution from the executive and
legislative branches of government.
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